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1Introduction 
Citizenship brings many benefits to immigrants, the opportunity to participate more fully in our democracy through 
the right to vote being primary among them. But beyond the clear civic gain is an often overlooked economic benefit: 
for a variety of reasons, naturalized immigrants are likely to see a boost in their family incomes that can benefit their 
children, their communities and the nation as a whole.
Why is the economic importance of naturalization – the process by which immigrants become citizens – so often 
overlooked? Part of the reason is that much of the heated debate around the economic effects of immigration 
in the U.S. tends to focus on the unauthorized (or “illegal”) population. The economic evidence in this arena 
points in multiple directions – positive gains at an aggregate level, negative effects on specific sectors of the labor 
market, mixed impacts on government coffers – but lost in that discussion is the fact that nearly three-fourths of all 
immigrants are either naturalized citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), those who have legal status and 
may be eligible to naturalize but have not yet done so (Passel and Cohn 2011, p. 10). 
What would happen if those individuals who were eligible to naturalize actually chose to do so? How much would 
their economic situation improve – and what would be the effects on the overall economy? If such gains are possible, 
how could policymakers help to encourage even higher rates of naturalization? 
In this policy brief, we tackle these questions by combining individual-level data from the Census Bureau’s 2010 
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) with the most recent data on the number of LPRs eligible to naturalize from 
the U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS). We first use the Census data to generate estimates of the “earnings 
premium” associated with naturalization: even controlling for many of the other characteristics that predict 
individual wages, we find that earnings can rise by around 8 to 11 percent. We then use the OIS data to simulate a 
reasonable scenario in which we step up the rate of naturalization in order to reduce the pool of those eligible by 
half: we find that aggregate earnings increase on the order of $21 billion to $45 billion over ten years, depending 
on how rapidly we can achieve the naturalization target. The impact on GDP can be even larger once we take into 
account the secondary effects of higher incomes on spending and demand. 
This brief proceeds as follows: We begin with a review of the literature, drawing out both theory and evidence 
on why naturalization might be associated with a higher earnings trajectory. We then discuss the data we employ 
and the regression models we develop; as will be seen, we make a number of choices along the way to insure that 
our estimates are as conservative as possible. We then discuss how the wage trajectory might change over time 
– benefits would actually accrue over a number of years – and then turn our attention to the possible impacts on 
aggregate earnings and the overall economy. We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications, particularly 
how we might make those benefits clear to those who have not yet naturalized and how we could use new financial 
and other vehicles to induce higher levels of naturalization.
Previous Research on the Economic Benefits of 
Naturalization 
Why Might Naturalization Have Economic Benefits?
On the whole, naturalized immigrants have better economic outcomes than their non-citizen counterparts – but 
they also tend to have substantially higher levels of what economists refer to as “human capital” (e.g. experience, 
education, and English language ability) and vary by other key characteristics as well (recency of arrival, country 
of origin, etc.). For that reason, the focus of the research has been on whether citizenship matters per se for the 
2economic outcome of immigrants, or whether the differences in outcomes are actually explained by differences in 
other characteristics.1 
Why might naturalization matter? The two main ways in which obtaining citizenship could lead to better economic 
outcomes are thoroughly examined in Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir (2002). They describe two broad channels: job 
access and the acquisition of “U.S.-specific human capital” which is incentivized by a decision to remain in the U.S. 
permanently. 
Better access to jobs through attaining citizenship can occur for a variety of reasons, including the fact that many 
public-sector jobs actually require citizenship – and they tend to pay better (Shierholz 2010). Holding a U.S. passport 
is also an asset for jobs that require international travel. Beyond the actual job requirements, citizenship can also 
be a signal to employers that an immigrant has characteristics they are looking for in an employee, such as a basic 
command of English and possession of “good moral character” – both requirements for naturalization (USCIS 2012) 
– as well as a commitment to remain in the U.S. (and on the job) for the long term. Finally, some have suggested that 
citizenship is an assurance of legal status for employers who may be worried about facing sanctions for inadvertently 
hiring undocumented workers and would thus shy away from non-naturalized immigrants (Mazzolari 2009, 186). 
Citizenship is also thought to be associated with the acquisition of U.S.-specific human capital. After all, with planned 
permanent residency in the U.S. may come a greater incentive to make long-term investments (e.g. obtaining tailored 
education and/or specific vocational training, starting a U.S.-based business, or social networking with those in the 
same regional labor market) that might not be made if the plan was to eventually go back home. Unfortunately, 
because U.S.-specific human capital is often not measurable in survey data – education just shows up as education 
rather than a set of courses in a very specific U.S.-based career – it can pose challenges for estimating the economic 
benefits of naturalization. On the other hand, this also means that finding a difference in income for a naturalized 
immigrant, once you have controlled for education level, regional labor market, and other factors, could be a signal of 
this sort of citizenship-induced investment in U.S.-specific human capital.
Previous Estimates of the Economic Benefits of Naturalization
There are two broad approaches that have been employed in testing whether citizenship matters for immigrant 
economic outcomes. Both use regression analysis – a statistical technique that attempts to separate the impact of 
citizenship on income from the impacts of other individual characteristics. Where they differ is in their periodicity: 
the first approach involves using cross-sectional data (i.e. data for multiple individuals at one point in time) and then 
modeling income as a function of citizenship and a set of “control variables” thought to affect individual income 
levels while the second (and far less common) approach tries to track the same individuals over time to see what 
difference naturalization may have made in their economic trajectory.
The first study of immigrants in the U.S. using the cross-sectional approach was by Barry Chiswick and used 1970 
census data (Chiswick 1978). He found that citizenship had a positive effect on earnings of adult foreign-born 
white men controlling for many important factors, but the effect lost significance once controlling for the length 
of residence in the U.S. In later analysis using 1980 census data on adult foreign-born men of all races, however, 
he reported a significant effect of about 5 percent, dropping to 4 percent once English language proficiency was 
controlled for (Chiswick and Miller 1992).
Since that early work, a body of international research has emerged that finds positive and significant relationships 
of citizenship with regard to earnings and employment (see, for example, DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2004; Bevelander 
and Pendakur 2011). However, it was not until very recently that another U.S.-based study relying entirely on the 
1 Sumption and Flamm (2012) also provide a review of the literature but provide less econometric detail on earlier studies and 
do not conduct their own regression analysis. That publication, however, offers a broader view than we do of the policy context 
and related issues and is a very useful companion read.
3cross-sectional approach was released. That report, by Heidi Shierholz of Economic Policy Institute, found that among 
immigrant families, citizenship was associated with family income that was 15 percent higher and poverty rates that 
were 3 percentage points lower (Shierholz 2010). 
While the cross-sectional analysis is useful, there are several limits to this approach. The first is simply that 
the control variables must be measurable and available in the cross-sectional data itself. If there are important 
unobservable characteristics for determining economic outcomes that cannot be included in the regression and they 
happen to be related to citizenship, then the estimated impact of citizenship on economic outcomes are “polluted” 
by their influence. For example, suppose that the choice of citizenship is associated with a “go-getter” attitude – then 
the finding of a positive economic effect for citizenship may really reflect how that sense of internal drive (and not 
citizenship) intersects with labor market outcomes. 
A second key issue in the cross-sectional approach is legal status: because authorization to work is generally 
not available in public survey data, it cannot be entered as a control variable. As a result, any economic gain to 
citizenship one finds could simply be a difference between those who are lawfully in the country (and hence can 
become citizens) and those who are not; as will be seen, we try to deal with this below. A third potential issue is 
reverse-causality: as pointed out in Sumption and Flamm (2012), the significant financial costs that are incurred 
during the naturalization process likely mean that the decision to naturalize partly depends on income levels, yet the 
model assumes that causation runs in the other direction. 
Given these potential issues with the cross-sectional approach, a second approach to gauging the impact of 
naturalization involves estimating wage gains using longitudinal data (for the same group of people over time). 
With a longitudinal approach, one can theoretically account for individual characteristics (like “drive”) that are not 
captured in survey questions but are likely to impact both the decision to naturalize and income (what are called in 
the literature “individual fixed effects”). Such an approach also puts aside the issue of the unauthorized: in order to 
become a citizen, one needs to be authorized first so any gain from citizenship is just that (since to become a citizen, 
one must have already obtained legal status). Finally, a longitudinal approach also helps sort out the causality issues 
because one is tracking the income gain over time for the same person – and the way in which their initial income 
factored into the naturalization decision is already captured in the starting point of that trajectory.
Unfortunately, such longitudinal studies are a challenge data-wise and hence are few and far between. The only 
study on immigrants in the U.S. using this method (that we are aware of) is  Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir (2002). 
Using data on 332 young male immigrants followed from 1979 through 1991, they found (among other things) that 
naturalization was associated with a wage gain of around 5.6 percent in their sample; they note that this is not a one 
shot gain and use an alternative set of specifications to suggest that naturalization leads to a small initial increase 
followed by wage growth over time that is faster than that of immigrants who did not naturalize but were otherwise 
similar.2 The wage growth factors they find would seem to suggest ultimate gains from naturalization could be larger 
than the 5.6 percent – after all, they are tracking young men for only 12 years and so the average total increases they 
2 In what is probably their best specified model (Table 7, column 2), one that controls for job shifts over time to the public 
sector or white-collar employment and, like us, considers only immigrants, they find a statistically insignificant initial bump of 1.3 
percent, followed by an additional 1.8 percent increase in wages for every year after naturalization, with that second effect being 
statistically significant (Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir 2002, 588). This specification is close to our own model with occupational 
and industry controls. A specification that appears most comparable to ours without such controls comes earlier in the paper, 
and suggests an initial gain of around two percent (which is also not statistically significant) and subsequent (and statistically 
significant) annual gains of less than 2.5 percent (see Table 5, column 4). A subsequent study that carried out a similar analysis, 
but on immigrants in Germany, found more modest gains – an initial wage boost of less than one percent and then faster wage 
growth of only 0.29 percent per year (Steinhardt 2008). While the two studies are not really comparable given the many economic 
and social differences between the U.S. and Germany, one reason for the higher wage growth in the Bratsberg et al. effort may 
be, as noted in the text, that the empirical focus is on young males.  As we see below, we find that there are declining returns to 
naturalization after a 12-17 year period and returns are higher for females. The Bratsberg et al. sample includes only males and is 
time constrained such that no one is allowed to experience the declining returns to naturalization, whereas the Steinhardt study 
(and ours) considers females and older adults as well.
4estimate are a lower bound for a sample that would include females and older adults who might have more time 
since their date of naturalization. 
One real strength of the Bratsberg, et al. (2002) study is that the authors directly compare the cross-sectional 
approach and the longitudinal approach on the same data. They do this by conducting a cross-sectional analysis 
of Census data, Current Population Survey data, and the dataset they use in their longitudinal work, the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The results for all three cross-sectional analyses – all limited to young adult 
males – suggest that naturalization is associated with a wage increase of between 5 and 6 percent (with all controls 
in the regression analysis), a  figure that is almost exactly what they find when they subject the NLSY data to the 
“over-time” analysis described above. Given the consistency of these results, we have more confidence that a 
cross-sectional approach will yield reliable results – and also anticipate that a cross-sectional estimate that includes 
those who have had more time since naturalization might find a larger overall effect.
In any case, the available research suggests that naturalization has some positive effect on income – even controlling 
for many important factors that also determine income levels. The purpose of our analysis below then is not to 
answer the question of whether there are economic benefits associated with attaining citizenship, but rather to 
provide a current estimate of the economic benefits that might accrue to the newly naturalized and what they could 
mean for the U.S. economy. 
Estimating the Returns to Naturalization
Describing the Data and Basic Methods
To derive a current estimate of economic benefits of naturalization, we focus on the annual earnings of individual 
immigrant workers in the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS).3 We consider individual annual earnings rather 
than other measures of income (e.g. wages, family income) for several reasons. First, to the extent that naturalization 
increases one’s employability, this would include gaining more hours of work; in this sense, a strict focus on hourly 
wages would tend to understate the total income benefits of naturalization and overall earnings is thus the better 
measure.4 Second, we consider individual earnings because we believe this is the more appropriate unit of analysis. 
At least one recent study has estimated the return to family income that is associated with naturalization of the head 
of the family. This approach essentially compares the family incomes of naturalized-immigrant headed families to 
those headed by non-citizen immigrants (Shierholz 2010). The underlying assumption here is that the naturalization 
of one person (the family head) can impact the income of other family members, perhaps because new citizens, who 
have themselves improved their job prospects, are able to help their spouses or other family members find better 
jobs. While this may be true, there is no way to really test this network effect and the more conservative approach 
(and one more consistent with the bulk of the existing empirical research) would be to focus on the link between 
citizenship attainment and individual earnings.
Using individual earnings as the dependent variable, we conduct a multivariate regression analysis using the 
cross-sectional approach described above. The basic approach in such a regression is to include as many factors 
as possible that are important in predicting income – and to then introduce a “dummy variable” that takes a value 
of one if the individual is a naturalized citizen and interpret the resulting coefficient on that dummy variable as 
3 Specifically, the 2010 ACS data we use is from IPUMS (Ruggles et al. 2010).
4 We considered including unearned income as well (e.g. rental income, capital gains, public subsidies), but there is either less 
theoretical basis for gains in these income sources through naturalization, or, in the cases of public subsidies, the increase is a 
transfer rather than a result of real or perceived enhancement in human capital.
5the percentage gain from naturalization.5 While the longitudinal approach might better control for individual 
characteristics, as noted above, results obtained using both approaches with the same data point in the same 
direction and even roughly to the same size effect (Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir 2002). Moreover, the advantage of 
cross-sectional data is sample size: while sample sizes tend to be relatively small in longitudinal datasets, the 2010 
ACS covers about 1 percent of the U.S. population, including a raw count in that year of nearly 350,000 immigrants. 
We focus on the immigrants in the sample because including non-immigrants in our regressions could create 
problems if there were, for example, different returns to education for the U.S.-born (which seems likely; after all, 
part of our argument for gains is based on the notion of U.S.-specific human capital investments). We further restrict 
our attention to immigrants ages 18 and older, not living in group quarters, who had worked during the year prior to 
the survey, with earned income between $400 and $292,000 in 2010.6 We also omitted all respondents who arrived 
in the U.S. since 2005 as they are not likely to be eligible to naturalize.7 The resulting sample size is just over 183,000, 
sizable enough to test multiple factors and achieve statistically significant results.
In our regression model, we control for a set of basic characteristics that are common to any wage or earnings 
equation: personal and household characteristics, including gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, and the presence 
of children; so-called “human capital” characteristics, including educational attainment, and potential work 
experience;8 industry and occupation controls (for a set of 15 industries and 24 occupations); and geographic 
characteristics, including a set of state dummies to account for state-level differences in earned income. In addition 
to these, we also control for other measures that are more immigrant-specific and can be found in other studies 
modeling the economic benefits of naturalization. These include English speaking ability; recency of arrival in the U.S. 
(split into four periods and represented as dummy variables); and country of origin (a set of 20 dummy variables for 
the top 20 countries of origin for immigrants in the 2010 ACS). The latter country-of-origin controls are particularly 
important given that naturalization rates, incomes, and many of the key human capital measures noted above vary 
systematically by country of origin. 
Finally, we include two measures that seem appropriate but were not found in our review of the literature: the 
immigrant/citizenship status of one’s spouse and a measure of “area unemployment.”  The first measure seemed 
useful in helping to reduce bias. Given the increased propensity to naturalize for immigrants married to U.S. citizens 
(Woodrow-Lafield et al. 2004), if the same immigrants also tend to have higher income, holding other factors 
constant, then the omission of this information from the model would tend to overstate the returns to naturalization. 
To examine differences by spousal immigrant status (i.e. U.S.-born or foreign-born citizen), we included two separate 
dummy variables: one for marriage to a naturalized citizen and one for marriage to a U.S.-born citizen. The second 
new measure we introduced was a measure of local (that is, metro area) unemployment. This was based on the 
notion that particularly “loose” labor markets (i.e. those with high unemployment rates) generally have lower 
earnings and so controls for that effect are relevant, particularly if naturalized immigrants are more attracted to areas 
with low unemployment (which would then overstate the “citizenship effect”).9 
5 The percentage calculation requires specifying the dependent as the natural log of earnings, something that is standard in 
labor market literature.
6 The income range was determined by excluding the top and bottom 1 percent of the sample – an attempt to omit so called 
“outliers” – that is, observations that could skew the regression line by their extreme values. This is a standard approach, 
particularly with Census data where income is self-reported. 
7 Aside from those married to U.S. citizens and other special circumstances, one needs to reside in the U.S. for five continuous 
years to be eligible to naturalize.
8 As is standard in such regressions, we also include the squared value of work experience; this reflects the idea that, after some 
period of time, there are declining returns to additional work experience and the square allows the relationship between work 
experience and income to take the shape of an inverted “U”.
9 We are grateful to Michael Fix of Migration Policy Institute for suggesting area unemployment rates as a relevant measure. It is 
calculated as the unemployment rate for the metropolitan area in which an immigrant in our sample resides, or for persons living 
outside of a metro area, the rate for the non-metro portion of the state in which they reside, using the same 2010 ACS microdata 
that is used for calculating all other measures.
6Simple Differences Analysis: Size and Economic Characteristics of the 
Naturalized and Non-Citizen Immigrant Population
Before turning to our regression results, we look into some of the “raw” or unadjusted differences in the economic 
characteristics of naturalized and non-citizen immigrants, as compared to the U.S-born population. Of course, these 
simple differences overstate the effect of citizenship but they are useful to better understand the many ways in which 
the other characteristics of naturalized immigrants differ from those of non-citizens – and thus what we are seeking 
to control for in the regression exercise. 
We begin, however, by looking at the current size and composition of immigrants by citizenship and permanent 
residency status, as well as the size of the eligible-to-naturalize population. This information is provided in Table 1, 
where data for the top 10 countries of origin for the eligible-to-naturalize population are broken out as well. In all, 
there are nearly 40 million immigrants living in the U.S – about 17.5 million of which are naturalized citizens, leaving 
some 22.5 million non-citizens. Among the non-citizen immigrants, 13 million are LPRs, and about two-thirds of those 
(roughly 8.5 million) are estimated to be eligible to naturalize (that is, they have resided in the U.S. for a sufficiently 
long period of time to be eligible to apply). Most of the remaining 4.5 million, while not included in our calculations 
of aggregate economic benefits below, will be eligible to naturalize by the end of 2015. 
Mexico is by far the top country of origin for the eligible-to-naturalize, followed by the Philippines as a distant 
second; the next eight top countries of origin have following similar numbers of eligible-to-naturalize LPRs. As can be 
seen in the table, Asian immigrants in these top 10 tend to have the highest naturalization rates, and Latin American 
immigrants the lowest. Part of this surely has to do with higher rates of unauthorized status among immigrants 
from Latin America: when comparing the number of LPRs from each country to the number of non-citizens, we find 
that only about a third of non-citizens from Mexico and El Salvador have LPR status (with the rest presumed to be 
largely unauthorized) while the vast majority of non-citizens from the Philippines and Vietnam hold LPR status.10 The 
trends for China and India are different, with roughly half of non-citizens holding LPR status. In the case of these two 
sending countries, the remainder (non-citizens without LPR status) is likely to include a large number of student-and 
work-visa holders, along with the unauthorized. 
10 Note that because data on non-citizens and LPRs were estimated separately (and for slightly different time periods), they 
should not be expected to be entirely consistent. For example, note that for the number of non-citizens from Vietnam is smaller 
than the number of eligible-to-naturalize from that country. This, of course, is not possible and should be interpreted as indicating 
a very high rate of LPR status among non-citizens from Vietnam.
Country of Origin Naturalized % Non-Citizen %
Legal Permanent 
Residents (LPRs) %
LPRs 
Eligible 
to 
Naturalize %
Mexico 2,704 23% 9,043 77% 3,320 28% 2,650 23%
Philippines 1,155 65% 612 35% 590 33% 330 19%
Dominican Republic 417 47% 463 53% 470 53% 300 34%
Cuba 614 55% 498 45% 410 37% 280 25%
China 1,233 57% 935 43% 590 27% 260 12%
El Salvador 334 28% 873 72% 330 27% 260 22%
Canada 355 45% 430 55% 320 41% 260 33%
India 1,134 48% 1,243 52% 520 22% 240 10%
United Kingdom 332 49% 345 51% 290 43% 230 34%
Vietnam 930 75% 314 25% 330 27% 210 17%
Other, Foreign-born 8,250 52% 7,705 48% 5,900 37% 3,510 22%
Total 17,458 44% 22,461 56% 13,070 33% 8,530 21%
Table 1: Size of Immigrant Population by Citizenship, Residency Status
Notes: Universe includes total population. Data on LPRs are from Rytina (2012), and represent estimates for January 1, 2011. Numbers are in 
thousands. Percentages are figured as shares of all immigrants from each country of origin.
7Table 2 turns to the differences in economic characteristics between naturalized and non-citizen immigrants. We 
see a large difference in average annual earnings, with naturalized immigrants actually earning more (on average) 
than U.S. natives.11 The same goes for rates of full-time employment (which feeds into earnings),with 69 percent 
of naturalized immigrants working full-time compared to 62 percent of non-citizens and U.S. natives.12 Even more 
dramatic differences between the naturalized and non-citizens are seen when it comes to poverty, home ownership, 
and health insurance coverage. In the remainder of the table, we see that, compared to non-citizens, naturalized 
immigrants tend to have resided in the U.S. longer, have much better English-speaking abilities, and report higher 
education levels. Interestingly, the share with a doctorate is about the same for the naturalized and non-citizens, 
reflecting the presence of high-skill immigrants who may have come to the U.S. on a student or work visa and may or 
may not hold LPR status. 
 11  All reported figures in Table 2 through Table 4 are calculated for the regression sample, but expanded to include U.S. natives.
12 As is standard in the literature, full-time work is defined as having worked at least 50 weeks during the year prior to the survey 
with a typical work week of at least 35 hours.
Table 2: Socioeconomic Characteristics of U.S. Workers by Nativity and Citizenship
U.S.-born
Naturalized 
Im m igrants
Non-citizen 
Im m igrants
Average annual earnings $39,065 $43,579 $28,797
Average daily earnings $107 $119 $79
Full-time workers 62% 69% 62%
Below poverty 8% 6% 16%
Homeowner 71% 72% 45%
Has health insurance 84% 82% 49%
Years in the U.S. -- 25 16
Speaks English not at all 0% 1% 12%
Speaks English not well 0% 11% 27%
Speaks English well 1% 23% 23%
Speaks English very well 7% 45% 27%
Speaks English only 92% 19% 11%
Less than High School 7% 15% 40%
High School Graduate 27% 21% 25%
Some College 36% 27% 16%
Bachelors Degree 20% 22% 10%
Master's degree 8% 9% 5%
Professional degree 2% 3% 1%
Doctoral Degree 1% 2% 2%
Earnings, Employment and Assets
Years in the USA and English-speaking Ability
Educational Attainment
8Table 3 shows that there are fairly substantial differences in the industries and occupations in which naturalized 
immigrants are employed compared to non-citizens, with naturalized citizens showing much more similarity to the 
U.S.-born in terms of the jobs in which they work. For example, while non-citizens are far more concentrated in 
agriculture, construction, and accommodations and food services, naturalized immigrants are more likely to work in 
public administration, finance, insurance and real estate, education, health and social services, transportation and 
warehousing, and information. While these differences in sectors of employment reflect a mix of authorized versus 
unauthorized status and the generally bifurcated distribution of immigrants by skill level, some of the differences 
– most clearly in the case of public administration – reflect the potential for increased job access that citizenship 
can bring. Similar trends are seen when considering occupations, with non-citizens more focused in farming, 
construction, food preparation, and cleaning/maintenance jobs and naturalized citizens more likely to be found in 
healthcare, community and social services, protective service, management, education, office and administrative 
support, and computer, engineering and science occupations. 
Table 3: Industries and Occupations of U.S. Workers by Nativity and Citizenship 
U.S.-born
Naturalized 
Immigrants
Non-citizen 
Immigrants
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Mining 2% 1% 4%
Construction 6% 5% 14%
Manufacturing 10% 12% 12%
Wholesale Trade 3% 3% 3%
Retail Trade 12% 10% 9%
Transportation, Warehouse & Utilities 5% 6% 4%
Information 2% 2% 1%
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 7% 7% 3%
Professional, Management and Administrative Services 10% 11% 13%
Education, Health and Social Services 24% 24% 13%
Entertainment, Accomodation & Food Services 9% 9% 15%
Other Services 5% 6% 7%
Public Administration 6% 4% 1%
Armed Forces 1% 0% 0%
Management, Business & Financial 14% 14% 7%
Computer, Engineering & Science 5% 7% 4%
Community, Social Service and Legal 3% 2% 1%
Education, Training and Library 7% 5% 3%
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports & Media 2% 2% 1%
Healthcare Practitioners & Technical 5% 7% 2%
Healthcare Support 2% 4% 2%
Protective Service 2% 1% 1%
Food Preparation & Serving 5% 5% 10%
Buildings, Grounds Cleaning & Maintenance 3% 5% 12%
Personal Care & Service 3% 5% 4%
Sales and Related 11% 10% 8%
Office and Administrative Support 15% 12% 7%
Farming, Fishing and Forestry 1% 1% 4%
Construction & Extraction 5% 4% 13%
Installation, Maintenance & Repair 3% 3% 3%
Production 5% 8% 10%
Transportation & Material Moving 6% 6% 8%
Employment by Industry
Employment by Occupation
9Finally, Table 4 looks at differences in earnings between naturalized and non-citizen immigrants who have certain 
characteristics in common – those that have been shown in past research and in the tables presented above to 
be most useful in distinguishing naturalized immigrants from non-citizen immigrants and higher income earners 
from those earning less. The table shows that while there are in fact large overall differences in earnings between 
immigrants from different countries and differing levels of educational attainment and English speaking abilities, it 
is virtually always the case that if any of these characteristics is held constant, naturalized immigrants earn more 
than non-citizens. For example, while immigrants from China tend to have much higher earnings than immigrants 
from El Salvador overall, naturalized immigrants from both countries earn substantially more than their non-citizen 
counterparts. Look also at education: naturalized immigrants with a similar level of education always earn more and 
this persists in the upper strands of educational status, where it is unlikely that the difference is driven by, say, status 
as an undocumented resident. And while speaking English is an income enhancer for all immigrants, it is especially so 
for citizen immigrants.
Table 4: Average Annual Earnings for U.S. Workers by Nativity, Citizenship, and Selected 
Characteristics
U.S.-born
Naturalized 
Immigrants
Non-citizen 
Immigrants % Diff.
United States $39,065 -- -- --
Mexico -- $31,106 $20,994 48%
Philippines -- $48,982 $36,612 34%
Dominican Republic -- $31,334 $22,607 39%
Canada -- $56,159 $53,054 6%
Cuba -- $43,136 $23,234 86%
El Salvador -- $32,287 $23,334 38%
United Kingdom -- $58,420 $55,122 6%
China -- $54,928 $44,252 24%
India -- $58,167 $62,960 -8%
Vietnam -- $39,826 $25,095 59%
Other, Foreign-born -- $44,135 $32,790 35%
Less than HS $20,937 $26,044 $19,885 31%
HS Diploma (or GED) $28,890 $30,547 $23,860 28%
Some College $33,360 $36,063 $28,083 28%
Bachelor's Degree $52,514 $53,888 $46,263 16%
Master's Degree $63,007 $71,620 $66,386 8%
Professional Degree $89,846 $91,890 $70,600 30%
Doctoral Degree $80,841 $93,150 $75,347 24%
None $20,462 $21,320 $17,476 22%
Not well $29,507 $25,923 $20,690 25%
Well $29,203 $36,557 $26,923 36%
Very well $34,152 $49,370 $38,250 29%
Only $39,564 $49,596 $41,562 19%
Note: The "% Diff." column reports the percentage differences between earnings of naturalized and non-citizen 
immigrants (naturalized immigrants minus non-citizen immigrants).
By Country of Origin
By Educational Attainment
By English Speaking Ability
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While these comparisons do suggest that none of these important characteristics single-handedly “explain away” the 
earnings differential between naturalized and non-citizen immigrants, they do not provide compelling evidence that 
there is an independent relationship between citizenship and earnings. Indeed the differences in earnings shown in 
the final column of Table 4 still surely overstate the returns to citizenship, as there are likely important differences 
in human capital and other characteristics between, say, immigrants from Mexico who have attained citizenship 
and those who have not. To isolate the difference in earnings that is related to naturalization alone, all measureable 
factors that are thought to affect earnings as well as the decision to naturalize must be considered together in the 
context of a multivariate regression – a task we take up in the next section of this report. 
Adjusted Differences Analysis: Regression Results
Given the above examination of the many ways in which naturalized citizens differ from their non-citizen 
counterparts, what happens to the difference in earnings when we try to take all of these differences into account? 
The appendix to this policy brief offers the full regression results for the interested technical reader – if you are like 
us, you are eagerly turning there now–but if you are, shall we say, more normal, you probably just want to know 
the highlights. These include the fact that all of the control variables had the expected signs: more valued human 
capital characteristics, such as higher education levels, work experience, and English speaking ability are associated 
with higher earnings, being female or non-white is associated with lower earnings (however, for non-Hispanic 
Asians, the effect is only significant once industry and occupation controls are included), being married and having 
children is associated with higher earnings as compared to being unmarried (and, if married, having a U.S.-born or 
naturalized-immigrant spouse is associated with higher earnings than a non-citizen spouse), and living in a region 
with higher unemployment is, as expected, associated with lower earnings. 
Figure 1: Earned Income Returns to Immigrant Naturalization
43.0% 
14.9% 
9.1% 
6.6% 
41.2% 
18.6% 
11.2% 
7.9% 
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13.2% 
8.9% 
No controls Add human capital, 
personal & household 
controls 
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occupation controls 
Male  All  Female 
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What this basically means is that the regression is well-behaved and so we can focus on the specific variable of 
interest: citizenship. The results are shown in Figure 1. First, the unadjusted difference between average annual 
earnings of naturalized and non-citizen immigrants in our sample is large (around 41 percent), largely confirming 
the big gaps that were shown in the simple differences shown in the preceding tables.13  However, once we begin to 
control for differences in characteristics that are important in determining a worker’s earnings, this difference drops 
dramatically (and appropriately), first down to 19 percent after adjusting for human capital, personal and household 
characteristics; 11 percent after adding in migration, geographic and labor market controls; and, finally, 8 percent 
after accounting for differences in the industries and occupations in which people work. Consistent with previous 
research, the returns to naturalization for females are slightly larger – 9 percent as compared to 7 percent for males 
in the model with the full set of controls – and the figure of 8 percent is well within the range of other U.S. estimates.
While there is a clear and concrete case for inclusion of most of these control variables, for the last category – 
industry and occupation – the case is less clear. After all, some authors stress that one of the paths to higher earnings 
through naturalization is increased job mobility (Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir 2002). To the extent that job mobility 
involves a change in one’s industry or occupation of employment, the model does not allow the citizenship dummy 
variable to capture the positive effect such a change could have on one’s earnings. However, job mobility is not the 
only path to higher earnings, and obviously there are many immigrants who do not change industries or occupations 
after naturalizing (even if they change jobs). With these considerations in mind, we suggest that the “true” impact on 
earnings from gaining citizenship falls somewhere between the 8 and 11 percent figure, and treat the two results as 
lower- and upper-bound estimates, respectively, for the remainder of our analysis.
Given the fairly dramatic differences in characteristics detailed above, all of which are important determinants of 
earnings, it is not surprising that they account for the majority of the difference in earnings between naturalized and 
non-citizen immigrants. However, the fact that a statistically significant difference persists even after taking many 
other important factors into account, suggests that policies designed to increase naturalization could yield important 
economic benefits for both immigrants themselves and for the U.S. economy as a whole.
What About the Unauthorized? Results from California
An important limitation to the cross-sectional regression analysis presented above is that we are only able to control 
for characteristics that are measured in public survey data. One important control that we are unable to include in 
our analysis – and one we are obliged to pay particular attention to given its centrality to the immigration debate – is 
legal status. After all, when an immigrant naturalizes, they move from holding LPR status to citizenship – not from 
unauthorized status to citizenship (which, of course, is not possible as LPR status is a precondition to citizenship). 
Given that unauthorized immigrants tend to be concentrated in low-wage jobs and might be subject to significant 
labor exploitation, wouldn’t their inclusion among the non-citizens in our sample tend to overstate our estimate of 
the returns to naturalization? 
On the face of it, the answer to this question would seem to be a clear “yes.” However, there are reasons why this 
might not be the case. As noted above, there are many characteristics that we are unable to control for, but they are 
only a problem for our estimate of the returns to citizenship if: (1) they are related to both the decision to naturalize 
and income, and (2) their effect is not largely captured by other variables already included in the model. 
13 The observant reader may notice that this is less than the 51 percent difference in earnings indicated in Table 1. The reason is 
that we are looking at the difference in the logged values of annual earnings. This is standard in the literature because unlike raw 
values, logged differences are not affected by whether you are asking about the percent one value is above or below another – 
and that better allows you to track the effects of specific variables because the reported coefficient is then the percent difference 
either up or down.
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For example, we might assume that people who are really good communicators are both more likely to naturalize 
and earn more than people who are less articulate. However, given that higher levels of educational attainment tend 
to be positively correlated with communication skills, and that we control for education in our regression model, the 
fact that we are unable to control for communication skills directly is not likely to skew our results. Likewise, given 
that unauthorized status has been shown to be closely associated with a set of variables that are included as controls 
in our model (e.g. country of origin, educational attainment, year of arrival in the U.S., English speaking ability, 
industry, occupation), the inability to directly control for the unauthorized may not have a noticeable effect on our 
results. 
Of course, it would be even better if we knew who was unauthorized among the non-citizen immigrants in our 
regression sample; we could then exclude them from the regression, leaving the citizenship dummy to capture just 
the difference between naturalized immigrants and authorized non-citizens. While this is information that we do 
not have for our entire U.S. regression sample, we do have such estimates for a subset of our sample: Latinos in 
California. These estimates are based on work done by Enrico Marcelli of San Diego State University in which he 
conducted a set of surveys of Mexican immigrant adults in Los Angeles County, collecting information on both legal 
status and many other socio-demographic characteristics that are common in public survey data.14 Marcelli then 
uses the data to model authorization as a function of variables that are also publicly available, including age, gender, 
education, and recency of arrival in the U.S. We borrow and apply the regression coefficients from this model to the 
individual answers in the Census to assign a probability of authorized status; while this model is likely not suitable 
to predict who is unauthorized among all non-citizen immigrants in our U.S. regression sample, our experience is 
that it is reasonably valid when extended geographically to all of California, and demographically to include all Latino 
immigrant adults.15
With that done, we then ran the same earnings models using only the California portion of our regression sample. 
We first ran the same models reported on in Figure 1 for the entire California regression sample, and because our 
unauthorized estimates are only for Latinos, we then replicated the model, restricting the sample to Latinos only (to 
note any differences in the returns to naturalization for that immigrant group), and finally ran it again restricting to 
Latinos but excluding those individuals that were estimated to be unauthorized. These results are reported in Table 
5.16
For comparative purposes, in the first column we reiterate the results for all immigrants from the U.S. regression 
sample, as reported in Figure 1. When comparing to the second column, which reports the results for the California 
sample only, we find that the returns to naturalization are somewhat higher in California than in the U.S. overall, 
with a raw (unadjusted) difference in earnings of about 50 percent, falling down to about 11 percent once all of the 
14 For a fairly recent description of the approach, see Marcelli and Lowell (2005).
15 For example, we have used it as such in past research, and found it to produce an estimate of the total number of 
unauthorized Latino adults in California that was very close to other estimates that were based on different data and different 
methodologies, particularly the “residual” approach of estimating the undocumented population (see, for example, Pastor et al. 
(2010).
16 To conserve space, the detailed results for these regression models are not included in this report but are available upon 
request.
Table 5: Earned Income Returns to Immigrant Naturalization, Restricted Samples
Full Regression 
Sample, 
all U.S. 
Full Regression 
Sample, 
CA Only
Latinos 
Only
Latinos Only, 
Excluding the 
Unauthorized
No controls 0.412 0.499 0.415 0.348
Add human capital, personal & household controls 0.186 0.220 0.281 0.253
Add migration, geographic & labor market controls 0.112 0.139 0.196 0.190
Add industry & occupation controls 0.079 0.109 0.153 0.148
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controls are entered into the model. Interestingly, while the raw returns to naturalization for Latinos in California 
(the third column) are somewhat lower than those for all California immigrants (41 percent as compared to 50 
percent), they are higher under the fully specified model (15 percent as compared to 11 percent). This is likely due to 
differences in human capital and other characteristics between Latino and other immigrants being captured by the 
various control variables, as they are entered, leaving the citizenship variable more “pure” – that is, coming closer to 
capturing the independent relationship between citizenship and earnings, and not simply picking up the (positive)  
earnings impact associated with being a non-Latino immigrant – a group that tends to have higher citizenship rates 
than Latino immigrants (as evidenced in Table 1). 
In the fourth and final column, unauthorized Latinos are dropped from the regression sample, effectively leaving the 
citizenship variable to pick up differences in earnings between naturalized Latino immigrants and their non-citizen 
(but authorized) counterparts. There we find results that are not dramatically different from the model that included 
the unauthorized (third column), and the difference between the two gets smaller as more controls are introduced 
into the model. The unadjusted difference is about 35 percent when the unauthorized are excluded from the sample 
as compared to 42 percent when they are included, but these figures both round to around 15 percent under the full 
specification.
These results may also help to explain a conflict between results we found in a cross-sectional examination of the 
returns to authorization (Pastor et al. 2010) and the results obtained in a very different look at the gains to LPR status 
using a smaller but longitudinal sample (Hill, Lofstrom, and Hayes 2010). In that work, we estimated a nearly 10 
percent gain from authorization while Hill, Lofstrom and Hayes found negligible gains, with one of their rationales for 
this surprising result being that in current economic conditions, there was very little difference in the labor market 
for authorized and unauthorized immigrants. 
We think there may be some issues with sample bias in the work by Hill, Lofstrom, and Hayes but the results above 
also suggest that it is possible we were both right. After all, they were looking at a very short time period after 
gaining LPR status, and if the real gain comes from citizenship, it is not likely that they would have found a positive 
effect since it takes at least five years to become naturalized. At the same time, the cross-section distinction we found 
may have been partly due to citizenship itself, something that is suggested by the small difference in the citizenship 
effect when we include the unauthorized. We note further that the wage gains some researchers suggested came 
from the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act – the so-called Reagan “amnesty” – accrued years later and could 
also partly reflect citizenship (as well as a different economy, time period as well as improved job mobility).17
The bottom line of this analysis: while the inclusion of the unauthorized in the non-naturalized immigrant base 
seems like it should distort a comparison of earnings between naturalized immigrants and non-citizen (but 
authorized) immigrants, it does not seem to do so in a state and population for which we have better information on 
authorization. Given that the comprehensive set of human capital and other controls we use to predict earnings are 
also predictive of legal status, this result should actually not come as much of a surprise.
How Long Does It Take for Benefits to Materialize?
If naturalization does indeed have a positive effect on earnings, how long do those increased earnings take to 
materialize? While this question was addressed in the longitudinal analysis of Bratsberg et al. (2002), it has not been 
possible to explore with the use of cross-sectional Census data until very recently. In 2008 the ACS added a question 
asking naturalized immigrants the year in which they naturalized. Using information gleaned from this question in our 
2010 ACS microdata, we ran the same regression model presented above, but rather than entering the citizenship 
dummy as a single variable, we split it into a set of dummy variables capturing those who naturalized during different 
periods of time prior to the survey.
17 See the review of the literature in (Hinojosa-Ojeda 2010).
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Recall that the longitudinal analysis in Bratsberg et al. (2002) suggested that there was an initial gain followed by 
faster wage growth over time. Thus, we set the first period at less than two years since naturalization – using two 
years instead of one to increase the sample size and hence statistical reliability – in order to capture the more 
immediate effect of naturalization on earnings.18 This initial period included about 7 percent of all the naturalized and 
subsequent periods were determined such that each band of years since naturalization included about 20 percent 
of all naturalized immigrants in the regression sample, with the final range – 30 or more years since naturalization – 
capturing about 12 percent of the sample. 
The results of this regression are summarized in Figure 2.19 There, we find a boost in earnings of 5.6 percent for those 
who naturalized one or two years ago, a figure that is fairly close to that found using a comparable specification from 
Bratsberg et al. (2002).20 The effect increases with experience since naturalization, reaching about 10 percent for 
immigrants who naturalized 12 to 17 years prior to the time of the survey. The relative slowdown in increased returns 
to earnings with each year since naturalization differs from Bratsberg et al. (2002) but recall that they are focused 
on younger workers and a relatively short time since naturalization. We would note that the growth per year we find 
over the long haul is actually quite close to that obtained in Steinhardt (2008). In any case, our results do support the 
notion, however, of a relatively immediate boost in earnings associated with naturalization, with additional gains over 
subsequent years. 
18 The number of years since naturalization referred to here is figured such that the past two years includes all persons in the 
2010 ACS who reported naturalizing in 2009 or 2010 (about 7 percent of all naturalized immigrants in our regression sample). 
19 Detailed regression results are not included here as there were no important changes to any of the other regression 
coefficients, but are available upon request.
20 Table 7, column 24 of that paper has the results that are likely closest to our specification presented here. There is an initial 
gain of 1.26 percent and wage growth of 1.79 percent per year thereafter; the average gain for those either one or two years after 
naturalization is 3.9 percent. While this is somewhat lower than our 5.6 percent, given the inclusion of females in our sample and 
many other differences, it appears reasonably close.
Figure 2: Earned Income Returns to Immigrant Naturalization by Recency of Naturalization 
(lower bound estimates) 
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Our results also suggest that the gains to naturalization appear to diminish for those who naturalized long ago, falling 
back down to only about 6 percent for those who naturalized 30 or more years ago. Such a result was not found in 
Bratsberg et al. (2002) – but again, their sample included only younger immigrants and that may also partly explain 
why their estimated trajectory was so sharp (and we suspect, unrealistically so). A decline in returns is, however, not 
entirely surprising: the citizenship effect could simply wear off over time, in accordance with the law of diminishing 
returns.21 Such a result was not found, however, in Bratsberg et al. (2002) – but again, their sample included only 
younger immigrants and that may also partly explain why their estimated trajectory was so sharp (and we suspect, 
unrealistically so).22
There are more specific reasons why the citizenship effect might diminish over time. For example, consider our 
argument that citizenship “signals” to employers that the employee is definitely lawfully in the country and more 
likely to be committed to remain in country and on the job. Immigrants who have been in the U.S. for a very long 
time are likely to be more Americanized in both their work profile and human capital investments, weakening the 
power of citizenship as a signaling device to employers for traits they are looking for, such as command of English, 
good character, legal status, and a commitment to remain in the U.S. (recall that the regression controls for recency 
of arrival so we are focused on how citizenship differentiates two immigrants with the same tenure in the U.S.). Yet 
another (related) reason could be that immigrants who naturalized a long time ago tend to be less Latino and Asian; 
even though we are trying to control for labor market discrimination against these groups by adding control variables 
21 This is why age or work experience is typically entered as a quadratic function in wage or earnings regressions (i.e. years of 
work experience and its square are both included on the right-hand side rather than work experience alone) – to allow the model 
to account for diminishing returns to years of work experience.
22 In fact, the models in Bratsberg et al. do not allow for diminishing returns to naturalization as experience since naturalization 
is never entered as a quadratic.
Figure 3: Earned Income Returns to Immigrant Naturalization by Recency of Naturalization 
(upper bound estimates allowing for industry and occupational shifts)
7.2% 
9.9% 
12.4% 
13.5% 
12.9% 
10.0% 
1 to 2 3 to 6 7 to 11 12 to 17 18 to 29 30 or more 
Years since naturalization 
16
for ethnicity, it could be that the citizenship “signal” is less important for long-naturalized (and more likely to be 
white) immigrants. 
We should also note something that is relevant to subsequent calculations: the estimates of the gains for each period 
since naturalization in Table 2 are based on our lower-bound estimates, from the model in which we are controlling 
for industry and occupation – which essentially means that one of the quite logical outcomes of naturalization, the 
enhanced ability to job-switch, is essentially ruled out as one of the ways in which to increase earnings. If we allow 
for such job shifting immediately and throughout the rest of one’s work life, we get a higher initial return and the 
gains last longer before declining.23 We suspect that the probable outcome in terms of both the size of the effect and 
the path it takes over time lies somewhere in the middle.
In either case, the upshot is that citizenship pays – and that the premium rises slowly over time. Any program seeking 
to help the economy by encouraging citizenship would need to differentiate between short-term effects (in the first 
few years) and long-term effects. It may also be, as suggested in Shierholz (2010), that there are even more long-run 
gains than we indicate if the naturalization of one household member confers benefits on another through access to 
a wider range of social contacts, more U.S.-specific human capital investments, and improved employment.
Potential Economic Impact of Immigrant Naturalization
So immigrants might benefit from naturalization – but what about the rest of us? In this section, we do a brief 
calculation of the economic benefits to the overall U.S. economy of large numbers of immigrants naturalizing. 
While we first note the income gains possible under a scenario of complete naturalization of all eligible immigrants 
in a single year simply to illustrate the process of our calculations, we then point out the returns if we assume a 
more realistic path of increasing naturalization such that we halve the pool of the eligible to naturalize under three 
different time frames.
Of course, the first issue is why we might expect an improvement in the overall economy anyway. Part of the reason 
is that the wage gain we estimate is not redistributive: the sort of wage regressions used above essentially estimate a 
worker’s worth and how it changes with changes in control variables, and hence the estimated boost from citizenship 
is an addition to productivity and income.24 These “supply side” gains come, as we noted, from more U.S.-specific 
human capital investments and a better match between employer and employee. However, the new earnings of 
immigrants may then trigger a demand-side impact as a portion is spent, “rippling” through the economy and 
generating additional income, spending and economic activity. 
This logic implies that we need to do two basic estimates: first, calculate the aggregate increase in immigrant income 
due to naturalization, and second, the induced effects that may emerge as that income flows into new spending. We 
spend most of this section on the first and more direct effect; we close by discussing some ways to think about the 
induced effect.
23 This is consistent with the differences in initial gains and subsequent wage growth in Table 5, column 4 and Table 7, column 
2 in Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir (2002), in which the effects are smaller once some sectoral factors are introduced into the 
regression analysis.
24 The underlying assumption is that our regression estimates reflect a labor market in equilibrium, and thus the increase in 
earnings of newly naturalized immigrant workers results from meeting the demand for labor at the going wage. Note that this 
implies an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) of at least the amount of the increase in earnings for newly naturalized 
immigrants, as for each additional dollar paid out in wages there is some amount of profit (on average). Thus, our estimates are 
conservative as there are likely to be attendant increases in firm profits that are not taken into consideration here.
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The basic process to estimate the direct increase in immigrant aggregate income involves multiplying the average 
annual earnings for non-citizen immigrants by the estimated returns to naturalization from our regression model 
as presented in Figure 1.25 To play it on the conservative side, we focus first on the estimate of the returns to 
naturalization obtained in the fully specified model with industry and occupation controls; however, parallel to 
our path estimates above, we note that one important impact of naturalization could be increased mobility and 
so we also present a set of estimates that includes shifts in industry/occupation on the part of newly naturalized 
immigrants. 
In both cases, the average dollar gain per newly naturalized immigrant per year is then multiplied by the number of 
persons who are both eligible to naturalize (according the most recent estimates from the OIS) and likely to see gains 
in earnings from naturalization. That means we need to know how many of those eligible to naturalize are actually 
working, a data point not readily available in data from the OIS. On the other hand, the share of all non-citizen 
immigrants in the 2010 ACS that met the cut to be included in our primary regression sample was 46.2 percent. We 
believe this is a lower-bound estimate of the share of the eligible-to-naturalize who are working since naturalization 
might also step up attachment to the labor force; we note, for example, that nearly 62 percent of all immigrant 
citizens in the 2010 ACS made the cut into our regression sample, suggesting that non-citizen immigrants who are 
currently not working might move into the labor force.
If we now multiply the estimated gain in earnings for the average newly naturalized immigrant by the total number 
of eligible-to-naturalize workers, we get an estimate of the maximum possible direct increase in annual earned 
income. That set of basic calculations is shown in Table 6; as can be seen, using the approximate 8 percent increase 
in earnings from naturalization alone, we find an aggregate increase in earnings of 9 billion dollars per year, an effect 
that rises to nearly 13 billion dollars if we allow for the possibility of gains in earnings from changes in industry and/
or occupation. Note further that that the actual impact on the economy would be larger because we have not yet 
included any of the induced effects from the new spending such earnings might spur.
25 Note that using average earnings for all non-citizens included in our regression sample as the basis for calculating the dollar 
increase in earnings via naturalization will tend to understate the result. This is because, as noted above, the non-citizens in our 
regression sample include the unauthorized as well as those who are authorized, but not eligible to naturalize – both of whom 
tend to have lower earnings than immigrants who are eligible to naturalize.
Table 6: Impact on Annual Immigrant Citizen Earnings from Full-Naturalization Scenario
Eligible-to-Naturalize Workers
Total Eligible to Naturalize 8,530,000                  
x Share of Non-Citizens in Regression Sample 46.23%
= Eligible to Naturalize Workers 3,943,820                  
Increase in Earned Income from Naturalization (per worker)
From 
Naturalization 
Alone
Including 
Industry/
Occupation 
Effect
Average Earnings for Non-Citizens in Regression Sample $28,797 $28,797
x Returns to Naturalization 7.93% 11.22%
= Increase in Earned Income from Naturalization (per worker) $2,283.19 $3,232.39
Increase in Immigrant Earnings
Eligible-to-Naturalize Workers 3,943,820                  3,943,820                  
x Increase in Earned Income from Naturalization (per worker) $2,283.19 $3,232.39
= Aggregate increase in earned income $9,004,479,623 $12,747,970,768
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Of course, not everyone who is eligible will naturalize – there are reasons, such as attachment to homeland, which 
may mean that some immigrants never opt for U.S. citizenship. Moreover, even if every eligible individual decided to 
naturalize, it is unlikely they would all do so in a single year (plus, imagine the workload in the offices of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services!). Thus, below, we create a partial and phased naturalization scenario and calculate those 
impacts.
To do this, we begin by considering estimates of the eligible-to-naturalize as reported in a series of reports by Nancy 
Rytina of the OIS at the end of each year, along with the number of naturalizations reported by the OIS during each 
year, as well as the average over the previous five years (to give a sense of the longer-run trend).26 As can be seen 
in Figure 4, the number of naturalizations fluctuates from year to year, with a peak in 2008 of about 1,046,000 
naturalizations. The five-year average is steadier, of course, hovering around the range of 600,000 and 700,000 per 
year. Thus, despite the steady flow of naturalizations, the concurrent flow of new LPRs has meant that there has been 
little change in the pool of the eligible-to-naturalize, which has remained remarkably stable, showing only a modest 
increase over the past decade. 
26 All data is from the Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS). Naturalizations per year are from the 2011 Yearbook of Immigration 
Statistics. The number of LPRs eligible to naturalize are from a series of reports by Nancy Rytina which began in 2004 (providing 
estimates as of January 1st, 2002), with most recent estimates from a 2012 report (estimates as of January 1st,  2011). No such 
report was released with estimates for January 1st, 2005, so this data point was interpolated. The estimate for January 1st, 
2012 has not yet been released, so this data point (for year’s end 2011) was estimated as the stock of the eligible to naturalize 
at year’s end 2006, plus the number of LPRs attaining status from 2002 through 2006, less the number of naturalizations from 
2007 through 2011, adjusted downward slightly (by 9 percent) to account for mortality and emigration. Applying this approach to 
earlier years yielded estimates that were very close to those reported by the OIS.
Figure 4: The Eligible-to-Naturalize Population and Naturalization, 2001-2011 (Thousands)
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To look at the possible economic gains, we set as a target not naturalizing everyone possible but simply halving the 
stock of eligible-to-naturalize LPRs by stepping up the rate of naturalizations per year. To reach this goal, a program 
would have to yield about 4.3 million naturalizations in addition to those that would have otherwise occurred 
(essentially working down the stock while maintaining the current flow).27 We assume that only a portion of those 
will be working adults – we use the same low end guess as in Table 6 – since it is unlikely that the government 
would target only that population (although private business-initiated efforts, discussed below, might exhibit such 
targeting). 
We estimate three scenarios – one in which we achieve the overall naturalization goal in five years, one in which we 
achieve the goal in seven years, and one in which we achieve the goal in 10 years. For each scenario, we calculate the 
cumulative impact on immigrant earnings over the 10 years after the program is initiated. To facilitate the calculation, 
we make a simplifying assumption that the increase in naturalizations required to reach the goal is spread evenly 
over the program’s time frame; for example, in the 10-year scenario, one tenth of the goal is achieved in year one 
and so it is not until year 10 that we have worked down the stock by half. This implies that gains in each year increase 
by the amount of new naturalizations in excess of historic levels (i.e., year two has two tenths of those we hope to 
naturalize making higher wages). We also assume that the returns to earnings from naturalization change over time 
according to the estimates reported in Figures 2 and 3 (so that the first cohort in a 10-year scenario sees its gains rise 
after several years while the last cohort in has only one year since naturalization and hence only enjoys the initial 5.6 
percent gain in the case where no one can switch jobs and 7.2 percent gain in the case where we have relaxed the 
industry and occupation controls).28
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7. The most modest of the three programs meets the naturalization 
goal in 10 years; it requires just over 1 million naturalizations per year (only 4 percent higher than the 2008 peak) 
and would result in an increase in cumulative immigrant earnings over 10 years of between 21 billion and 29 billion 
dollars. The most ambitious program assumes that the goal is reached within five years. This would require about 
1.5 million naturalizations per year (about 44 percent higher than the 2008 peak), and would result in additional 
immigrant earnings of between 32 billion and 45 billion dollars over 10 years, with the lower-bound estimate 
assuming no job shifts and the upper-bound assuming a quickly realized and full ability to job switch. As suggested 
before, the probable effect lies somewhere in the middle.
Of course, the cycle does not necessarily end there: increased income is spent and produces additional gains in 
GDP. To consider this, we turned to both a recent set of macroeconomic multipliers calculated by Mark Zandi, Chief 
Economist of Moody’s Analytics (Zandi 2011) and a related analysis by Robert Pollin and Heidi Garrett-Peltier (2011). 
Zandi is focused on demand-side fiscal policies and so provides a range of estimates of the one-year change in GDP 
27 This statement assumes a number of naturalizations per year equal to the 2001 through 2011 average of about 650,000, and 
that this rate of naturalization would leave the pool of about 8.5 million eligible to naturalize unchanged as has been the general 
case over the past decade.
28 All other aspects of our estimation procedure are the same as those described above to estimate the impact of a 
full-naturalization scenario on annual immigrant earnings, as reported in Table 6, including the use annual average earnings for 
non-citizen immigrants in our regression sample ($28,797) as the basis for the calculations (with no adjustment for earnings 
growth over time that is unrelated to the impact of naturalization), and the assumption that only 46.2 percent of the newly 
naturalized are workers and will thereby see an increase in earnings.
Table 7: Impact on Immigrant Citizen Earnings from Partial-Naturalization Scenarios
Program to halve the 
eligible to naturalize 
population in…
Number of 
naturalizations per 
year
Increase in 
naturalizations per 
year over peak year 
(2008)
Cumulative increase in 
immigrant earnings 
over 10 years (lower 
bound)
Cumulative increase in 
immigrant earnings over 
10 years (upper bound)
5 years 1,512,109 44% $31,903,221,816 $44,677,213,157
7 years 1,268,395 21% $27,393,402,749 $38,261,962,178
10 years 1,085,609 4% $21,166,781,923 $29,400,820,587
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(in dollar terms) expected to result from a one-dollar increase in government spending (or reduction in federal 
tax revenue). The size of the multiplier for different policy proposals reflects the differences in the extent to which 
the recipients of the government spending will turn around and spend that money immediately, sending it cycling 
through the economy and generating additional income and spending.29 It is no surprise that he finds that the 
multiplier for an increase in food stamps (1.71) is higher than that for an across-the-board tax cut (1.04) – there is 
not much one can do with food stamps but spend them while money saved on taxes might go directly into savings 
or debt service. Similarly, Pollin and Garrett-Peltier find a comparatively higher employment multiplier for personal 
tax cuts versus increased military spending, with their estimate of induced effects a bit higher than that implied by 
Zandi’s figures.
For our estimates, the most relevant multiplier may be the one Zandi provides for the Making Work Pay Credit, partly 
because that policy was aimed at a population whose average annual earnings mirror those of the non-naturalized 
immigrant workforce. That multiplier is 1.17, meaning that a $1 increase in income for the newly naturalized will 
result in a $1.17 increase in GDP.30 The Pollin and Garrett-Peltier estimates of induced effects suggest a multiplier 
for induced effects that would be higher. But using the more conservative Zandi approach suggests an overall gain 
that would fall between $37 billion and $52 billion over the 10 year period for the most aggressive naturalization 
program. This number is likely a severe underestimate of the overall impact because the initial boost to GDP has 
elements of a supply shock in which productivity is permanently increased due to more U.S.-specific human capital 
and a better match between employers and employees. All this suggests that the figures cited above for the increase 
in earnings is a minimum gain to be had by pursuing a relatively modest program of increased naturalizations.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Obtaining citizenship involves jumping a number of hurdles, most of which most Americans think are quite 
reasonable. For example, to be naturalized, LPRs must demonstrate English language proficiency, knowledge of 
US history and government, and pass a criminal background check. They must also pay for the application and 
biometrics tests (USCIS 2012).
The policy question is when do hurdles become obstacles, particularly given the gains to be had for both immigrants 
and the nation. One issue is the size of the application fee; with the biometrics fee, the cost totals $680. In a survey 
of 526 LPRs in Texas, Freeman, Plascencia, and Gonzalez Baker (2002) found that among eligible LPRs who had not 
filed a naturalization application, 20 percent cited cost as a prohibitive factor, 24 percent a lack of time, and about 16 
percent (each) the lack of English proficiency or knowledge about navigating the naturalization system. 
Does cost really matter? Some evidence of price sensitivity was shown when USCIS increased the cost to naturalize 
from $400 to $595 (plus the costs of biometrics) in the middle of 2007: the result was a surge of applications just 
prior to the fee increase. As a result, there were nearly 1.4 million naturalization applications filed in 2007 but just 
over 500,000 in 2008 (Sumption and Flamm 2012 citing Department of Homeland Security 2011). Afterwards, the 
number of applications has slowly increased to more typical levels, suggesting that adjustments do take place. But 
it is also important to realize that the fee itself is a lower-bound estimate of costs: successful applicants may also 
need to put time and money into English and civics courses, as well as obtaining any needed legal or other assistance 
in preparing the paperwork (Leighton et al. 2008). While these costs are not comfortable for, say, a middle-income 
29 The magnitude of such multipliers also varies with economic conditions: when the economy is operating at near full capacity, 
with low unemployment and high demand, they tend to be lower; if the reverse is true (such as the current state of the economy), 
they tend to be higher.
30 The average annual earnings of non-citizen immigrants in our regression sample ($28,797) is close to an approximation of 
the average income for all workers that qualify for the credit ($26,290). The latter figure was calculated by taking the average 
of annual earnings for all workers in our regression sample, expanded to include U.S. natives, that had earnings below $75,000, 
which is the upper limit on Adjusted Gross Income to be eligible for the this particular credit. 
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earner, they can be unreachable for many low-income 
immigrants – and, in fact, approximately 52 percent of LPRs 
eligible to naturalize are low-income (Passel 2007). 
Given the economic gains that can be realized, we think there 
is an argument for decreasing the cost of naturalization, 
including facilitating the application process to reduce the 
need for assistance. But it can also lead one to wonder why 
more immigrants don’t just make the civic and economic leap. 
Part of the issue is liquidity: for low-income LPRs, saving up is 
a challenge and other pressing family needs may take priority. 
A 2010 survey of Latino immigrants who had attended one 
of NALEO’s Ya Es Hora! citizenship workshops reported that 
one quarter of attendees had borrowed money to cover the 
application fee while more than two fifths of those who had 
postponed their application reported cost as the reason for 
doing so (Ramirez and Medina 2010). Of those who postponed 
because costs were too high, 93 percent claimed they would be 
more likely to file an application if loans were available to assist 
with the application cost.
Thankfully, solutions to this liquidity issue are being forged. 
Part of the Citizenship Maryland effort, CASA de Maryland and 
Citi Community Development (part of Citigroup) have piloted 
a microloan program to help with naturalization fees that is 
so successful that places like New York and San Francisco are looking to it and the National Council of La Raza is also 
considering how to support its replication. CASA began looking for solutions when – much like NALEO – immigrants 
they were working with were deterred from naturalization because they could not afford the fees, on top of other 
costs. With staff and funding from Citi, CASA worked with the Latino Economic Development Corporation and the 
Ethiopian Community Development Council Enterprise Development Group to grant loans. These loans are for the 
amount of the fee (plus biometrics); applicants pay a $25 application fee – which is deposited back into the owners’ 
new savings account upon repayment – and repay the loan at an interest rate of 8.5 to 9 percent. The idea is to 
enable citizenship as well as establish credit (through loan repayment) and get new Americans headed towards a 
surer financial future. To date, 100% of loans have been repaid and Citi Community Development recently won an 
E Pluribus Unum prize from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) for its leadership in this effort (CASA de Maryland 
2011; Citigroup, Inc. 2012).
Beyond the finances, Citizenship Maryland also offers help in navigating the naturalization process.  Such assistance 
can also rack up costs – assistance fees, legal counsel fees, translation services – but the complexity of the process 
can be a barrier unto itself. In a report written by the Washington College of Law, CASA, and Tenants and Workers 
United, the authors noted that the complexity, lack of one-on-one assistance, and fear of US CIS scrutiny in the 
post-9/11 era deters many (Leighton et al. 2008). Part of this gap can be filled by non-profits, faith-based groups and 
community organizations that offer application assistance and some basic guidance at a very minimal cost.31   But 
part of this gap also needs to be filled by the U.S. government – by simplifying the process and promoting citizenship.
31 Interviews with CASA de Maryland and Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) in September 2012, by Anthony 
Perez with the USC Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration.
Micro-financing the Midwest
The State of Illinois partnered with 
the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant 
and Refugee Rights to launch 
the New Americans Initiative, a 
statewide naturalization assistance 
program.  A cornerstone of this 
initiative is the microloan programs 
in which local organizations 
throughout the state partner with 
commercial and community banks 
as well as credit unions to help ease 
the costs of naturalization fees. 
These loans range from a minimum 
of $680 to a maximum of about 
$1,500 and usually are repaid in 
about 6-12 months with minimal 
interest. 
Source: Cost and Financing, The New 
Americans Initiative, Illinois Coalition for 
Immigrant and Refugee Rights. http://
icirr.org/node/1181
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Another key way to propel naturalization is addressing the English language gap.32  An MPI report estimated that 
55 percent of eligible LPRs were Limited English Proficient in 2005 (Sumption and Flamm 2012) and while Freeman 
et al. (2002) cite cost as an issue, as indicated above, they also suggest that English proficiency is a key obstacle to 
naturalization. In an analysis of the heavily immigrant state of California, MPI documented the ongoing undersupply 
of English language courses for those in need of improving their proficiency (McHugh, Fix, and Gelatt 2007).33 The 
major issue here is a lack of funding as well as a lack of courses that are more easily accessible at a community level. 
While some federal monies are available and most states match those dollars at varying amounts, MPI suggests that 
there is a need to cultivate more resources.
Leadership matters as well. For example, in June of 2012, the U.S. Conference of Mayors adopted a resolution urging 
the Federal government to launch a “New Americans Initiative” using support from multiple agencies, such as the 
USCIS and the Department of Education, to actively promote naturalization (U.S. Conference of Mayors 2012). It cited 
as key strategies: reducing fees (suggesting that naturalization costs also be funded by government subsidies, not just 
fees), increasing funding for institutions helping with the citizenship process, and fully funding immigrant integration 
grants offered by the USCIS. Finally, it encourages cities across the nation to adopt such “New Americans Initiatives” 
as well. Leadership initiatives like these signal a welcoming attitude, elevate the importance of immigrants, and 
promote citizenship, and in doing so, dispel fears.
One important partner in all these efforts, the business sector, will benefit from the improved productivity, earnings 
and spending that seems to be associated with naturalization. There is already a range of efforts to promote English 
learning on the job – including the Sed de Saber program promoted by Marriott and English Under the Arches run by 
McDonald’s – and naturalization would seem to be a reasonable next step. For several years, Trifinity Manufacturing 
in Baltimore offered citizenship preparation classes and honored new citizen employees with a party.34 In Los 
Angeles, the Chamber of Commerce has begun to experiment with both promoting the message that naturalization 
is beneficial to business and persuading businesses to make information and materials available to employees. As 
described above, banks could help by developing more micro-loan products that could help immigrants bridge their 
way to a higher earnings future. And the National Immigration Forum has developed The Bethlehem Project, an 
effort to persuade businesses nationwide to establish on-site ELL programs and offer assistance in the naturalization 
process.
In short, this is a set of efforts in which all sectors have a role. Immigrant-serving organizations certainly should be 
part of the mix: they can be trusted allies in persuading immigrants that their interests and those of their families 
will be better served by taking the naturalization plunge. But naturalization is too important and too economically 
beneficial to the nation to confine citizenship promotion efforts to just those groups – or even just the federal 
government whose titular responsibility this is. Businesses, labor unions, mayors, non-profit leaders, ethnic and 
mainstream media, and many, many others can spread the message and create the opportunities for Lawful 
Permanent Residents to make that all-important passage to a more tangible sort of permanence: the status of being 
a U.S. citizen.
32 In some cases, immigrants first need to become literate in their own language even before beginning a new language. Centro 
Latino for Literacy in Los Angeles offers such services.
33 The California report is the first of its kind to do this analysis by county. Commissioned by the Zellerbach Family Foundation 
and Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees, the 2008 report entitled, “An Assessment of the English Language 
Instruction Need and Supply in California,” quantified the gap between English language supply and demand. 
34 These examples draw from Creating a WorkPlace ELL Program, available at http://cliniclegal.org/category/resources-type/
toolkits. Trifinity has since relocated its operations to Waukegan, Illinois.
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Nurturing Naturalization
We began this brief – which at this length is not really so brief – by noting that there are many reasons to encourage 
immigrants to obtain citizenship. The most profound, of course, is simply our commitment to democracy: those who 
have chosen to make their lives in this country should have a role in helping to determine the future for themselves 
and their children.
Yet another way they can influence that future – and the American future more broadly – is to enhance their 
contributions to economic as well as civic life. Naturalization offers a course for immigrants to do that, partly by 
signaling to employers the commitment to stay, partly by incentivizing their own investments in U.S.-specific human 
capital, and partly by facilitating a better match between companies and job seekers. 
The impact on earnings can be significant: we estimate an 8 to 11 percent gain in individual earnings, phased in over 
time. And the positive results for the U.S. economy could be helpful: using the mid-point between lower–and upper 
–bound estimates of gains and setting a goal of shrinking the number of the eligible non-naturalized by half over five 
years, we estimate an earnings boost of nearly $40 billion over the next decade, with secondary impacts likely to 
boost GDP even more. 
Why does this “citizen gain” go unrealized? A key issue is liquidity on the part of immigrants themselves: even if they 
know that naturalizing will improve their economic prospects, pulling together the cash to pay all the direct and 
indirect costs involved in the process can still be a heavy lift. Fortunately, both business leaders and groups working 
for immigrant integration are beginning to implement new programs that can point the way to overcoming these 
financial and other obstacles and better promote naturalization. And the government can help by streamlining the 
process and considering whether reductions in application fees and other costs might lower burdens in meaningful 
ways.
Those who have witnessed a naturalization ceremony often comment that there are few things more inspiring than 
watching a group of new Americans swear their allegiance to this nation and its principles. To know that it also can 
pay off economically is a bonus – and it is one that we should not leave lying on the floor. Encouraging naturalization 
is not just the right thing to do; it is an economic imperative in a nation still working to emerge from the shadow of 
recession. With the children of immigrants now totaling nearly one quarter of our overall youth population, it’s an 
investment in their future and the future of America.
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Technical Appendix
This appendix offers the tables with our full regression results. As noted in the text, all signs are as expected and 
virtually all variables are statistically significant. Note further that the explanatory power of the regression, as 
indicated by the adjusted R-squared, is generally consistent with labor market research.
Table A1: Estimated Returns to Naturalization, Full Model
Variables No Controls
Add human 
capital, personal 
& household 
controls
Add migration, 
geographic & 
labor market 
controls
Add industry & 
occupation 
controls
Citizen 0.412*** 0.186*** 0.112*** 0.079***
High school diploma or equivalent 0.171*** 0.124*** 0.110***
Some college 0.314*** 0.231*** 0.132***
Bachelor's degree 0.704*** 0.597*** 0.352***
Master's degree 1.034*** 0.899*** 0.576***
Professional degree 1.183*** 1.051*** 0.644***
PhD 1.257*** 1.126*** 0.843***
Work experience 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.046***
Work experience squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
Female -0.378*** -0.375*** -0.323***
Black -0.031*** -0.067*** -0.069***
Latino -0.134*** -0.051*** -0.031***
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.001 -0.014 -0.045***
Other, non-white -0.035** -0.067*** -0.058***
Married 0.038*** 0.070*** 0.051***
U.S.-born spouse 0.116*** 0.052*** 0.041***
Naturalized-immigrant spouse 0.030*** 0.014** 0.002
Children 0.068*** 0.072*** 0.059***
Speak English "very well" or only 0.171*** 0.105***
Area unemployment rate -0.022*** -0.018***
Constant 9.878*** 9.209*** 9.621*** 9.604***
Country of origin dummies? No No Yes Yes
Recency of arrival dummies? No No Yes Yes
State dummies? No No Yes Yes
Industry and occupation dummies? No No No Yes
Observations 183,474 183,474 183,474 183,474
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.250 0.269 0.336
Source: Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration (CSII) analysis of IPUMS 2010 American Community Survey (ACS).
Regression Results
Notes: (i) Dependent variable is the natural log of earned income during year before the survey was administered. (ii) "***" = 
significance at the .01 level; "**" = significance at the .05 level; "*" = significance at the .10 level. (iii) Sample includes 
immigrants who: arrived in the U.S. in 2004 or earlier (so as to restrict to those likely to be eligible to naturalize); were age 18 
or older at the time of the survey; worked during the year prior to the survey and had earned income between $400 and 
$292,000; were not living in group quarters at the time of the survey. (iv) All explanatory variables are dummy variables, with 
the exception of work experience and its square (figured in years) and the area unemployment rate (figured such that 10 = 10 
percent unemployment). (v) For the race/ethnicity dummy variables, Latino includes all persons identifying as being of 
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, leaving the other variables "non-Hispanic."
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Table A2: Estimated Returns to Naturalization, Full Model, Males Only
Variables No Controls
Add human capital, 
personal & 
household controls
Add migration, 
geographic & labor 
market controls
Add industry & 
occupation controls
Citizen 0.430*** 0.149*** 0.091*** 0.066***
High school diploma or equivalent 0.153*** 0.116*** 0.103***
Some college 0.262*** 0.196*** 0.121***
Bachelor's degree 0.659*** 0.566*** 0.334***
Master's degree 1.011*** 0.873*** 0.541***
Professional degree 1.082*** 0.963*** 0.602***
PhD 1.193*** 1.072*** 0.796***
Work experience 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.045***
Work experience squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
Black -0.176*** -0.201*** -0.167***
Latino -0.162*** -0.085*** -0.061***
Asian/Pacific Islander -0.076*** -0.085*** -0.104***
Other, non-white -0.115*** -0.143*** -0.126***
Married 0.099*** 0.124*** 0.103***
U.S.-born spouse 0.156*** 0.095*** 0.079***
Naturalized-immigrant spouse 0.059*** 0.044*** 0.031***
Children 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.097***
Speak English "very well" or only 0.158*** 0.100***
Area unemployment rate -0.024*** -0.018***
Constant 10.020*** 9.246*** 9.652*** 9.527***
Country of origin dummies? No No Yes Yes
Recency of arrival dummies? No No Yes Yes
State dummies? No No Yes Yes
Industry and occupation dummies? No No No Yes
Observations 100,059 100,059 100,059 100,059
Adjusted R-squared 0.051 0.257 0.276 0.333
Source: Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration (CSII) analysis of IPUMS 2010 American Community Survey (ACS).
Regression Results
Notes: (i) Dependent variable is the natural log of earned income during year before the survey was administered. (ii) "***" = significance at 
the .01 level; "**" = significance at the .05 level; "*" = significance at the .10 level. (iii) Sample includes male immigrants who: arrived in the 
U.S. in 2004 or earlier (so as to restrict to those likely to be eligible to naturalize); were age 18 or older at the time of the survey; worked 
during the year prior to the survey and had earned income between $400 and $292,000; were not living in group quarters at the time of the 
survey. (iv) All explanatory variables are dummy variables, with the exception of work experience and its square (figured in years) and the area 
unemployment rate (figured such that 10 = 10 percent unemployment). (v) For the race/ethnicity dummy variables, Latino includes all persons 
identifying as being of Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, leaving the other variables "non-Hispanic."
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Table A3: Estimated Returns to Naturalization, Full Model, Females Only
Variables No Controls
Add human capital, 
personal & 
household controls
Add migration, 
geographic & labor 
market controls
Add industry & 
occupation controls
Citizen 0.474*** 0.223*** 0.132*** 0.089***
High school diploma or equivalent 0.209*** 0.147*** 0.121***
Some college 0.388*** 0.283*** 0.148***
Bachelor's degree 0.768*** 0.639*** 0.369***
Master's degree 1.078*** 0.930*** 0.604***
Professional degree 1.316*** 1.165*** 0.721***
PhD 1.367*** 1.220*** 0.903***
Work experience 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.047***
Work experience squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
Black 0.116*** 0.082*** 0.046***
Latino -0.104*** -0.004 0.011
Asian/Pacific Islander 0.090*** 0.072*** 0.023*
Other, non-white 0.057** 0.025 0.022
Married -0.039*** 0.002 -0.013
U.S.-born spouse 0.076*** 0.006 -0.006
Naturalized-immigrant spouse 0.025** 0.013 -0.005
Children -0.006 0.002 -0.007
Speak English "very well" or only 0.183*** 0.102***
Area unemployment rate -0.020*** -0.016***
Constant 9.651*** 8.785*** 9.210*** 9.313***
Country of origin dummies? No No Yes Yes
Recency of arrival dummies? No No Yes Yes
State dummies? No No Yes Yes
Industry and occupation dummies? No No No Yes
Observations 83,415 83,415 83,415 83,415
Adjusted R-squared 0.052 0.220 0.242 0.325
Source: Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration (CSII) analysis of IPUMS 2010 American Community Survey (ACS).
Regression Results
Notes: (i) Dependent variable is the natural log of earned income during year before the survey was administered. (ii) "***" = significance at 
the .01 level; "**" = significance at the .05 level; "*" = significance at the .10 level. (iii) Sample includes female immigrants who: arrived in the 
U.S. in 2004 or earlier (so as to restrict to those likely to be eligible to naturalize); were age 18 or older at the time of the survey; worked 
during the year prior to the survey and had earned income between $400 and $292,000; were not living in group quarters at the time of the 
survey. (iv) All explanatory variables are dummy variables, with the exception of work experience and its square (figured in years) and the area 
unemployment rate (figured such that 10 = 10 percent unemployment). (v) For the race/ethnicity dummy variables, Latino includes all persons 
identifying as being of Hispanic or Latino ethnicity, leaving the other variables "non-Hispanic."
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